The paper presents a theoretical model with bureaucratic corruption where bribe income can leak out of an economy. In such an economy given its perception about the extent of leakage the government sets the price of public services required for entrepreneurship by maximizing the welfare of the...

Using the classic moral hazard problem with limited liability we characterize the optimal contracts when an other-regarding principal interacts with a self-regarding agent. The optimal contract differs considerably when the principal is ‘inequity averse’ vis-a-vis the self-regarding case....

The paper identifies a condition under which favouritism is beneficial to the principal even when the favoured agent is selected randomly. This paper also characterizes how the optimal incentive scheme changes in presence of random favouritism. Using a moral hazard framework with limited...

We in this paper provide an analytical structure to endogenize the optimal gestational surrogacy contract in terms of a simple moral hazard framework. We show that altruistic surrogacy is optimal only if the surrogate has lower outside option and is sufficiently altruistic. Otherwise commercial...

1. Introduction -- 2. Does an employment protection law matter? A panel data analysis of selected OECD countries, 1985-2012 -- 3. Network of legal citations: an analysis of some supreme court decisions on land acquisition in India -- 4. Surrogacy Contracting and Intermediation -- 5....