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Why do borrowers pledge collateral? : new empirical evidence on the role of asymmetric information
Berger, Allen N.; Espinosa-Vega, Marco A.; Frame, W. Scott - 2006
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003415434
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Why do borrowers pledge collateral? : new empirical evidence on the role of asymmetric information
Berger, Allen N.; Espinosa-Vega, Marco A.; Frame, W. Scott - In: Journal of financial intermediation 20 (2011) 1, pp. 55-70
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008989444
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The entry incentives of complementary producers : a simple model with implications for antitrust policy
Lleras, Juan Sebastián; Miller, Nathan H. - In: Economics letters 110 (2011) 2, pp. 147-150
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009241669
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Using cost pass-through to calibrate demand
Miller, Nathan H.; Remer, Marc; Sheu, Gloria - In: Economics letters 118 (2013) 3, pp. 451-454
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009729142
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Competition among spatially differentiated firms : an estimator with an application to cement
Miller, Nathan H.; Osborne, Matthew - 2011
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009618326
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Competition when consumers value firm scope
Miller, Nathan H. - 2008
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009709861
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The entry incentives of complementary producers : a simple model with implications for antitrust policy
Lleras, Juan Sebastián; Miller, Nathan H. - 2009
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009713636
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Cumulative innovation and competition policy
Raskovich, Alexander; Miller, Nathan H. - 2010
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009723855
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Competition among spatially differentiated firms : an empirical model with an application to cement
Miller, Nathan H.; Osborne, Matthew - 2010
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009723856
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Essays in antitrust and banking
Miller, Nathan H. - 2008
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010228720