I study Bayesian persuasion games with multiple persuaders in which the persuaders are non-competing: all persuaders want the decision maker to take the same action, regardless of the state. In the case of a single persuader, it is known from previous research that the persuader-optimal...

This paper extends the model of information cascade (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch, 1992) by introducing two correlated queues of players. By comparing the equilibrium outcomes of the two-queue game with the benchmark one-queue game, this paper finds out that the observability of...

This paper extends the model of information cascade (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch, 1992) by introducing two correlated queues of players. By comparing the equilibrium outcomes of the two-queue game with the benchmark one-queue game, this paper finds out that the observability of...

When a news platform such as Google News or Apple News selects personalized news for its user, will it select news that conforms to its user's bias, thus creating an “echo chamber”? To answer this question, this paper studies a game between a click-maximizing platform and a rational user who...