Non-competing persuaders
Year of publication: |
2020
|
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Authors: | Wu, Jiemai |
Published in: |
European economic review : EER. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0014-2921, ZDB-ID 207969-0. - Vol. 127.2020, p. 1-35
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Subject: | Bayesian persuasion | Endogenous information design | Multiple identical persuaders | Imperfect information | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Bayes-Statistik | Bayesian inference | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Signalling | Kommunikation | Communication |
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