We empirically investigate if tournaments between heterogeneous contestants are less intensive. To test our hypotheses we use professional sports data from the TOYOTA Handball-Bundesliga, the major handball league in Germany.[...]

Following tournament theory, incentives will be rather low if the contestants ofa tournament are heterogeneous. We empirically test this prediction using alarge dataset from the German Hockey League. Our results show that indeed theintensity of a game is lower if the teams are more...

We analyze a two-stage game between two heterogeneous players.At stage one, common risk is chosen by one of the players. At stagetwo, both players observe the given level of risk and simultaneouslyinvest in a winner-take-all competition. The game is solved theoreticallyand then tested by using...

We empirically investigate possible distortions in subjective performance evaluations. A keyhypothesis is that evaluations are more upward biased the closer the social ties betweensupervisor and appraised employee. We test this hypothesis with a company data set from acall center organization...

Following tournament theory, incentives will be rather low if the contestants of a tournament are heterogeneous. We empirically test this prediction using a large dataset from the German Hockey League. Our results show that indeed the intensity of a game is lower if the teams are more...

We empirically investigate if tournaments between heterogeneous contestants are less intense. To test our hypotheses we use professional sports data from the TOYOTA Handball-Bundesliga, the major handball league in Germany. Using either differences in betting odds or rankings to measure ability...

We empirically investigate possible distortions in subjective performance evaluations. A key hypothesis is that evaluations are more upward biased the closer the social ties between supervisor and appraised employee. We test this hypothesis with a company data set from a call center organization...

This paper reports data from a laboratory experiment on two-period moral hazard problems. The findings corroborate the contract-theoretic insight that even though the periods are technologically unrelated, due to incentive considerations principals can benefit from offering long-term contracts...