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Common agency with informed principals : menus and signals

Galperti, Simone - 2011

agency models with uninformed principals, the Delegation Principle (Menu Theorem) fails when principals are informed. I then … outcomes of arbitrary games with delegation as outcomes of a new game in which principals offer menus and send cheap …-talk signals. Next, I characterize the outcomes of arbitrary games without delegation as outcomes of a new game in which principals …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009376226

The roles of reputation and transparency on the behavior of biased experts

Bourjade, Sylvain; Jullien, Bruno - In: The Rand journal of economics 42 (2011) 3, pp. 575-594

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009377448

The benefits of sequential screening

Krähmer, Daniel; Strausz, Roland - 2011 - First version: October 12, 2011, This version: October 12, 2011

This paper considers the canonical sequential screening model and shows that when the agent has an expost outside option, the principal does not benefit from eliciting the agent's information sequentially. Unlike in the standard model without expost outside options, the optimal contract is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009381855

International franchise expansion of service chains : insights from the Spanish market

Baena, Verónica; Cerviño, Julio - In: The service industries journal 32 (2012) 7, pp. 1121-1136

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009551868

Ranking of signals in multitask agency models

Xie, Jia - In: Economics letters 112 (2011) 1, pp. 82-84

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009242112

When is multidimensional screening a convex program?

Figalli, Alessio; Kim, Young-heon; McCann, Robert J. - In: Journal of economic theory 146 (2011) 2, pp. 454-478

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009242909

Endogenous market structures and contract theory : delegation, principal-agent contracts, screening, franchising and tying

Etro, Federico - In: European economic review : EER 55 (2011) 4, pp. 463-479

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009243427

Gift-exchange, incentives, and heterogeneous workers

Non, Arjan - 2011

excessively strong incentives and a relatively high expected total compensation. -- reciprocity ; gift-exchange ; signaling game …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009261791

Krähmer, Daniel; Strausz, Roland - In: Journal of economic theory 146 (2011) 5, pp. 2159-2164

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009308109

Suspense and surprise

Ely, Jeffrey C.; Frankel, Alex; Kamenica, Emir - In: Journal of political economy 123 (2015) 1, pp. 215-261

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010513926