Similar Search Results

Fershtman, Chaim - In: International economic review 38 (1997) 4, pp. 763-774

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001228308

Fehrler, Sebastian; Janas, Moritz - 2021

case of delegation. On the other hand, any acquired information is better aggregated in case of delegation, where experts …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012549435

Delegation of investment decisions, and optimal remuneration of agents

Lindbeck, Assar; Weibull, Jörgen W. - In: European economic review : EER 129 (2020), pp. 1-26

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012514883

Delegating learning

Escobar, Juan F.; Zhang, Qiaoxi - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 2, pp. 571-603

Learning is crucial to organizational decision making but often needs to be delegated. We examine a dynamic delegation … delegation as a dynamic mechanism design problem and characterize the optimal delegation scheme. We show that private learning … discuss implications on learning delegation for distinct organizations. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587421

Delegation to a group

Fehrler, Sebastian; Janas, Moritz - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 67 (2021) 6, pp. 3714-3743

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012606973

Control aversion in hierarchies

De Chiara, Alessandro; Engl, Florian; Herz, Holger; … - 2022

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013252792

Control aversion in hierarchies

De Chiara, Alessandro; Engl, Florian; Herz, Holger; … - 2022

Companies typically control various aspects of their workers' behaviors. In this paper, we investigate whether the hierarchical distance of the superior who imposes such control measures matters for the workers' ensuing reaction. In particular, we test, in a laboratory experiment, whether...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013255629

Collusion and delegation under information control

Asseyer, Andreas - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 4, pp. 1547-1586

This paper studies how information control affects incentives for collusion and optimal organizational structures in principal-supervisor-agent relationships. I consider a model in which the principal designs the supervisor's signal on the productive agent's private information and the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415488

Why biased agencies could be the best monitors

Music, Kasim; Salzmann, Christian - In: European journal of political economy 63 (2020), pp. 1-10

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012311339

Strategic inattention, delegation and endogenous market structure

Cellini, Roberto; Lambertini, Luca; Ottaviano, … - In: European economic review : EER 121 (2020), pp. 1-10

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012264248