We investigate whether and how executives' social interactions affect their compensation. Using the social networks among 2,936 chief executive officers (CEOs) during 1999-2008, we report that socially connected CEOs receive significantly more similar compensation than non-connected CEOs. This...

This paper studies the propagation of import competition shock along the supply chain which leads firms to alter their capital structure. We find that a large reduction in import tariffs in a customer industry induces suppliers to choose more conservative financial policies via transmission of...

We examine how directors with investment banking experience affect a firm's acquisition behavior. We find that the presence of investment banker directors is associated with a higher probability of subsequent acquisitions, and such positive relation is not driven by reverse causality. Focusing...

We study the disciplinary role of short-maturity debt in cash-rich firms. We report evidence that such debt mitigates cash-rich firms' overinvestment in acquisitions. The disciplinary role is mostly concentrated among cash-rich firms that are weakly governed and have limited access to the public...

We study the disciplinary role of short-maturity debt in cash-rich firms. We report evidence that such debt mitigates cash-rich firms' overinvestment in acquisitions. The disciplinary role is mostly concentrated among cash-rich firms that are weakly governed and have limited access to the public...

Chinese Abstract:...

We examine the impact of social networks when they are likely to be most valuable. We find that firms well-connected to other firms through executives and directors have better performance and more investments during the 2007-2009 financial crisis, and this is especially true among financially...

We find evidence that labor unions affect CEO compensation. First, we find that firms with strong unions pay their CEOs less. The negative effect is robust to various tests for endogeneity, including cross-sectional variations and a regression discontinuity design. Second, we find that CEO...