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Hedlund, Jonas - 2014

This paper introduces private sender information into a sender-receiver game of Bayesian persuasion with monotonic sender preferences. I derive properties of increasing differences related to the precision of signals and use these to fully characterize the set of equilibria robust to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010458265

Bayesian Persuasion

Kamenica, Emir - 2009

When is it possible for one person to persuade another to change her action? We take a mechanism design approach to this question. Taking preferences and initial beliefs as given, we introduce the notion of a persuasion mechanism: a game between Sender and Receiver defined by an information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013153918

Private Bayesian Persuasion

Arieli, Itai - 2019

We consider a multi-receiver Bayesian persuasion problem where an informed sender tries to persuade a group of receivers to adopt a certain product. The sender is allowed to commit to a signaling policy where she sends a private signal to every receiver. The utility of the sender is a function...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012903658

Bayesian Persuasion Mediating Cheap Talk

Sagiev, Erkin - 2020

We study a multi-player model of sequential communication. A receiver obtains information from two sources. The first … modifies the initial information. We prove that Bayesian persuasion does not defy truthful communication in cheap talk, but … mitigate utility losses. We also demonstrate that a signalling rule in the persuasion is defined by whether the revealed …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012822471