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A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design
Pycia, Marek; Troyan, Peter - 2021
We introduce a general class of simplicity standards that vary the foresight abilities required of agents in extensive … matter what occurs at non-simple histories. We use our gradated approach to simplicity to provide characterizations of simple … mechanisms. While more demanding simplicity standards may reduce the flexibility of the designer in some cases, this is not …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012588492
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A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design
Pycia, Marek; Troyan, Peter - 2021
We introduce a general class of simplicity standards that vary the foresight abilities required of agents in extensive … matter what occurs at non-simple histories. We use our gradated approach to simplicity to provide characterizations of simple … mechanisms. While more demanding simplicity standards may reduce the flexibility of the designer in some cases, this is not …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013220157
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Mechanism design with aftermarkets : on the optimality of cutoff mechanisms
Dworczak, Piotr - 2016
I study a mechanism design problem of allocating a single good to an agent when the mechanism is followed by a post-mechanism game (aftermarket) played between the agent and a third-party. The aftermarket is beyond the direct control of the designer. However, she can influence the information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011865063
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Informational hold up and intermediaries
Utgoff, Naomi - In: Games 13 (2022) 5, pp. 1-14
Why do some incomplete information markets feature intermediaries while others do not? I study the allocation of two …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014418049
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Implementation with interdependent valuations
MacLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 3, pp. 923-952
It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent's type affects other agents' utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673132
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Electricity markets : designing auctions where suppliers have uncertain costs
Holmberg, Pär; Wolak, Frank A. - 2015
We analyse how the market design influences the bidding behaviour in multi-unit auctions, such as wholesale electricity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011410462
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Procurement mechanisms for assortments of differentiated products
Saban, Daniela; Weintraub, Gabriel - 2020
We consider the problem faced by a procurement agency that runs a mechanism for constructing an assortment of differentiated products with posted prices, from which heterogeneous consumers buy their most preferred alternative. Procurement mechanisms used by large organizations, including...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012244488
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Subsidies, knapsack auctions and Dantzig’s greedy heuristic
Ensthaler, Ludwig; Giebe, Thomas - 2009
A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a shortlisted set. Items are differentiated by quality and sellers have private reserve prices for their items. Sellers quote prices strategically, inducing a knapsack game. The buyer's problem is to select a subset of maximal quality. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003848830
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Central Bank Liquidity Auction Mechanism Design and the Interbank Market
Ollikka, Kimmo - 2013
We study whether the mechanism design in the central bank liquidity auctions matters for the interbank money market … valuations in the liquidity auctions. The model captures the relevant features of how the European Central Bank sells liquidity …. We use simulations to compare discriminatory price, uniform price and Vickrey auctions to a posted price mechanism with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013075449
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The quantitative view of Myerson regularity
Schweizer, Nikolaus; Szech, Nora - 2016
In mechanism design, Myerson regularity is often too weak for a quantitative analysis of performance. For instance, ratios between revenue and welfare, or sales probabilities may vanish at the boundary of Myerson regularity. This paper therefore explores the quantitative version of Myerson...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011416003