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Trust and betrayals: Reputational payoffs and behaviors without commitment

Pei, Harry - In: Theoretical Economics 16 (2021) 2, pp. 449-475

I study a repeated game in which a patient player wants to win the trust of some myopic opponents but can strictly benefit from betraying them. His benefit from betrayal is strictly positive and is his persistent private information. I characterize every type of patient player's highest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189075

Whom can you trust? : reputation and cooperation in networks

King, Maia - 2017

Community enforcement is an important device for sustaining efficiency in some repeated games of cooperation. We investigate cooperation when information about players' reputations spreads to their future partners through links in a social network that connects them. We find that information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011773641

An Experimental Investigation of Reputation Effects of Disclosure in an Investment / Trust Game

Lunawat, Radhika - 2020

This paper examines experimentally the reputation building role of disclosure in an investment / trust game. It …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014200864

A Reputation Game on Cyber-Security and Cyber-Risk Calibration

Han, Kookyoung; Choi, Jin Hyuk - 2022

To analyze strategic interactions arising in the cyber-security context, we develop a new reputation game model in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013297152

Trust and reputation under asymmetric information

Janas, Moritz; Oljemark, Emilia - 2020 - Version: September 10, 2020

We study the role of information about the multiplier in a finitely repeated investment game. A high multiplier increases the reputational incentives of a trustee, leading to more repayments. Our perfect Bayesian equilibrium analysis shows that if the trustee is privately informed about the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012422494

Enforcing social norms : trust‐building and community enforcement

Deb, Joyee; González-Díaz, Julio - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 4, pp. 1387-1433

We study impersonal exchange, and ask how agents can behave honestly in anonymous transactions without contracts. We analyze repeated anonymous random matching games, where agents observe only their own transactions. Little is known about cooperation in this setting beyond the prisoner's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012158850

The forward-looking disclosures of corporate managers : theory and evidence

Gropp, Reint; Karapandža, Raša; Opferkuch, Julian - 2016

We consider an infinitely repeated game in which a privately informed, long-lived manager raises funds from short-lived investors in order to finance a project. The manager can signal project quality to investors by making a (possibly costly) forward-looking disclosure about her project's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011504350

The forward-looking disclosures of corporate managers : theory and evidence

Gropp, Reint; Karapandža, Raša; Opferkuch, Julian - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011506852

Bayesian repeated games and reputations

Forges, Françoise; Salomon, Antoine - 2014

equilibria share some features with the ones of multi-sided reputation models. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010256693

Robustness of Reputation Effects under Uncertain Monitoring

Yang, Geyu - 2018

I study reputation effects under uncertain monitoring. I examine a repeated game between a long-run player and a series … uncertainty about the monitoring structure introduces new challenges to reputation building because there may not be a direct … ability to establish a reputation for commitment. I show that, when the short-run players cannot statistically distinguish …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012909525

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