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CEO incentives for risk shifting and its effect on corporate bank loan cost

Beladi, Hamid; Quijano, Margot - In: International review of financial analysis 30 (2013), pp. 182-188

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010460317

Does the director labor market offer ex post settling-up for CEOs? : the case of acquisitions

Harford, Jarrad V. T.; Schonlau, Robert J. - In: Journal of financial economics 110 (2013) 1, pp. 18-36

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010207961

Do corporate insiders use stock buybacks for personal gain?

Palladino, Lenore - In: International review of applied economics 34 (2020) 2, pp. 152-174

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012182377

CEO inside debt holdings and risk-shifting: Evidence from bank payout policies

Srivastav, Abhishek; Armitage, Seth; Hagendorff, Jens - In: Journal of Banking & Finance 47 (2014) C, pp. 41-53

Bank payouts divert cash to shareholders, while leaving behind riskier and less liquid assets to repay debt holders in the future. Bank payouts, therefore, constitute a type of risk-shifting that benefits equity holders at the expense of debt holders. In this paper, we provide insights on how...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931664

Risk-shifting and the regulation of bank CEOs’ compensation

Chaigneau, Pierre - In: Journal of Financial Stability 9 (2013) 4, pp. 778-789

This paper analyzes the effects of two regulatory mechanisms, namely a regulation of the structure of bank CEOs incentive pay and sanctions for the CEOs of failed banks, on bank risk shifting. We extend a standard model of CEO compensation by incorporating leverage and an investment decision. To...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010729659

CEO incentives for risk shifting and its effect on corporate bank loan cost

Beladi, Hamid; Quijano, Margot - In: International Review of Financial Analysis 30 (2013) C, pp. 182-188

Using a sample from 1993 to 2010 of U.S. corporate bank loans, we study the relationship between CEO incentives for risk-shifting, proxied by Vega, and the cost of corporate bank loans. Equity-based compensation can enhance risk-shifting incentives, encouraging managers to make risky choices to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010730293

Seeking safety: The relation between CEO inside debt holdings and the riskiness of firm investment and financial policies

Cassell, Cory A.; Huang, Shawn X.; Manuel Sanchez, Juan; … - In: Journal of Financial Economics 103 (2012) 3, pp. 588-610

CEO inside debt holdings (pension benefits and deferred compensation) are generally unsecured and unfunded liabilities of the firm. Because these characteristics of inside debt expose the CEO to default risk similar to that faced by outside creditors, theory predicts that CEOs with large inside...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010571676

Does the director labor market offer ex post settling-up for CEOs? The case of acquisitions

Harford, Jarrad; Schonlau, Robert J. - In: Journal of Financial Economics 110 (2013) 1, pp. 18-36

We examine the rewards for experience and ability in the director labor market. We show that large acquisitions are … also find that, in the case of acquisitions, experience is more important than ability. Both value-destroying and value …-increasing acquisitions have significant and positive effects on a CEO's future prospects in the director labor market. In addition to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010702373

Equity Vesting and Managerial Myopia

Edmans, Alex; Fang, Vivian; Lewellen, Katharina A. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

This paper links the CEO’s concerns for the current stock price to reductions in real investment. These concerns depend on the amount of equity he intends to sell in the short-term, but actual equity sales are an endogenous decision. We use the amount of stock and options scheduled to vest in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084396

Strategic News Releases in Equity Vesting Months

Edmans, Alex; Goncalves-Pinto, Luis; Wang, Yanbo; Xu, Moqi - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

We show that CEOs strategically time corporate news releases to coincide with months in which their equity vests. These vesting months are determined by equity grants made several years prior, and thus unlikely driven by the current information environment. CEOs reallocate news into vesting...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084526