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Two players with preferences distorted by the focusing effect (Koszegi and Szeidl, 2013) negotiate an agreement over several issues and one transfer. We show that, as long as their preferences are differentially distorted, an issue will be inefficiently left out of the agreement or inefficiently...
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and economically important impact on renegotiation behavior that goes beyond the effect of contracts on bargaining … threatpoints. We compare situations in which an initial contract is renegotiated to strategically equivalent bargaining situations … lower than in strategically equivalent bargaining situations without an initial contract. Moreover, buyers are more likely …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010342843
-management bargaining, pretrial negotiations, and international negotiations. I compute the set of interim incentive efficient mechanisms …This paper considers social contracts (or mechanisms) in negotiations with incomplete information in which an outside …, the ex ante incentive efficient mechanism, as well as the neutral bargaining solution. I numerically illustrate that the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013216591
the new product using the normatively appealing Nash bargaining solution (see Nash, 1950). In our model the disagreement … payoffs endogenously depend on the contest outcome. More precisely, a bargaining advantage is given to the leading worker in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012841137
We examine the role of competition and mergers in bargaining by embedding a performance game, in which retail prices … are determined by competition, into an axiomatic bilateral bargaining model, in which suppliers and retailers negotiate … wholesale terms. We prove existence and uniqueness of what we call the Nash-in-Shapley bargaining solution when threat points …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012896510
I study a repeated principal-agent game with long‐term output contracts that can be renegotiated at will. Actions are observable but not contractible, so they can only be incentivized through implicit agreements formed in equilibrium. I show that contract renegotiation is a powerful tool for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806553
It is well known that delegating the play of a game to an agent via incentive contracts may serve as a commitment device and hence provide a strategic advantage. Previous literature has shown that any Nash equilibrium outcome of an extensive-form principals-only game can be supported as a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012001777
surplus is more equitable compared to the case with a purely selfish worker. Moreover, the optimal contract with bargaining … approaches the welfare-optimal contract as the parties' bargaining power converges. Our results help explain why workers are … imply that raising the bargaining power of the less powerful party may increase welfare …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010341624