This paper studies risk selection between public and private health insurance when some individuals can purchase private insurance by opting out of otherwise mandatory public insurance. Using a theoretical model, I show that public insurance is adversely selected when insurers and insureds are...

<!--Début du contenu @xml:lang="en"-->?Recent research in industrial organization has emphasized the strategic value of incomplete contracts in vertical inter-firm relationships. This paper offers a screening rationale for contractual incompleteness in a class of producer-retailer economies when countervailing incentives arise. By...

In general, incentive pay is not desirable for two main reasons: it puts the worker or employee at risk of fluctuations in his/her wages and it is costly to run. Incentive pay may be explained and justified by four phenomena, which may have important effects on the net benefits of an...

Based on a non cooperative model with asymmetric information tested by means of a laboratory experiment, this paper examines the influence of a negotiation outcome on the demand behavior in subsequent negotiations. While the assumption of inflationary wage claims is rejected by the data, a...

This paper investigates the literature describing the microeconomic behaviour of agents using storage and future contracts, depending on the nature of their information and on the nature of competition. In the price stabilisation theory, even if it may have ambiguous effects on the distribution...

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An ‘efficiency wage’ model developed for Western economies is reinterpreted in the context of Stalin’s Russia, with imprisonment – not unemployment – acting as a ‘worker discipline device’. The threat of imprisonment allows the state to pay a lower wage outside the Gulag than...

I consider bilateral trade between a seller and a buyer with private valuations. The seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it price offer. If the seller observes the buyerʼs valuation (symmetric information), bilateral trade is trivially efficient. If the seller cannot observe the valuation...

This paper analyzes bilateral contracting in an environment with contractual incompleteness and asymmetric information. One party (the seller) makes an unverifiable quality choice and the other party (the buyer) has private information about its valuation. A simple deterministic exit option...

This paper presents a simple system for efficient regulation under asymmetric information. Each firm's income is controlled by a tax that depends on the firm's own output and on a parameter construed as a share permit. These “shares of total expected output” lower a firm's tax burden and are...