I study collusion between two bidders in a general symmetric IPV repeated auction, without communication, side transfers, or public randomization. I construct a collusive scheme, endogenous bid rotation, that generates a payoff larger than the bid rotation payoff.

This paper investigates fund-raising mechanisms based on a prize as a way to overcome free riding in the private provision of public goods, under the assumptions of income heterogeneity and incomplete information about income levels. We compare experimentally the performance of a lottery, an...

Bids in private value first price auctions consistently deviate from risk neutral symmetric equilibrium bids. It is difficult to explain this deviation with risk aversion. We propose and test two other explanations: (1) Bidders do not form correct expectations. (2) Bidders do not play a best...

This paper considers a public good game with heterogeneous endowments and incomplete information affected by extreme free-riding. We overcome this problem through the implementation of a contest in which several prizes may be awarded. We identify a monotone equilibrium, in which the contribution...

When procuring multiple products from competing firms, a buyer may choose separate purchase, pure bundling, or mixed bundling. We show that pure bundling will generate higher buyer surplus than both separate purchase and mixed bundling, provided that trade for each good is likely to be...

Competition in a multi-unit auction is measured both by the number of bidders and by the relative size of their demands, compared to the number of units on sale. For the same degree of competition (identical aggregate demand and supply), we can observe different demand structures. Do they have...

We analise emission permit auctions under leader-follower competition when the leader bids strategically and the follower acts as price-taker both at the auction and the secondary market. We obtain linear equilibrium bidding strategies for both firms and a unique equilibrium of the auction,...

We conduct a laboratory experiment where groups of 4 subjects constrained to obtain at most one good each, sequentially bid for 3 goods in first and second price auctions. Subjects learn at the beginning of each auction their valuation for the good and exit the auction once they have obtained...

Aggregate art price patterns mask a lot of underlying variation — both in the time series and in the cross-section. The authors argue that, to increase our understanding of the market for aesthetics, it is helpful to take a micro perspective on the formation of art prices, and acknowledge that...

This paper presents a model of trading in unique durable assets that provide idiosyncratic payoffs, such as art, luxury real estate, and firm subsidiaries. Agents make purchase and sale decisions in an auction market based on their private use value of the asset and on the expected resale...