Endogenous bid rotation in repeated auctions

I study collusion between two bidders in a general symmetric IPV repeated auction, without communication, side transfers, or public randomization. I construct a collusive scheme, endogenous bid rotation, that generates a payoff larger than the bid rotation payoff.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Rachmilevitch, Shiran
Published in:	Journal of Economic Theory. - Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531. - Vol. 148.2013, 4, p. 1714-1725
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Auctions \| Bid rotation \| Collusion \| Repeated games

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D44 - Auctions ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010678869