This paper analyzes how private decisions and public policies are shaped by personal and societal preferences (values), material or other explicit incentives (laws) and social sanctions or rewards (norms). It first examines how honor, stigma and social norms arise from individuals' behaviors and...

We study the interaction between a potential offender's (principal ) incentive to commit crimes and the potential victims' (agents) incentive to report crime. The probability of crime and the credibility of reports are endogenously determined in equilibrium, and the principal is convicted if...

There is a reward for a project that can be increased through ability, effort, and cheating. This is analysed for one agent and a team of two. As an extension, a preference for honesty is added, which can prevent cheating but not without limit and not so easily in the team context.

Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es, in die ökonomische Analyse des Versicherungsbetrugs einzuführenund einige grundlegende Determinanten für vertragswidriges Verhalten von Versicherungsnehmernaufzuzeigen. Dazu werden zunächst die strategischen Entscheidungsprobleme von Versicherungsnehmernund...

We study the role of whistleblowing in the following inspectiongame. Two agents who compete for a prize can either behave legallyor illegally. After the competition, a controller investigates the agents’behavior. This inspection game has a unique Bayesian equilibriumin mixed strategies. We...

Two firms produce a product with a horizontal and a vertical characteristic. We call the vertical characteristic quality. The difference in the quality levels determines how the firms share the market. Firms know the quality levels, consumers do not. Under non-comparative advertising a firm may...

An arbiter can decide a case on the basis of his priors, or the two parties to the conflict may present further evidence. The parties may misrepresent evidence in their favor at a cost. At equilibrium the two parties never testify together. When the evidence is much in favor of one party, this...

We consider a model of polluting firms subject to tax on emissions, monitoring, and penalties in case of underreporting and which face a choice between a more expensive clean and a less expensive dirty technology. Moreover, emissions are subject to random events.We show that the optimal...

We characterize equilibria of an income reporting game with bounded returns and no commitment where detected tax evaders are charged the maximally feasible amount. Introducing partial commitment to punishment relief eliminates multiplicity of equilibria. We identify a unique limit equilibrium...

This paper analyzes how private decisions and public policies are shaped by personal and societal preferences ("values"), material or other explicit incentives ("laws") and social sanctions or rewards ("norms"). It first examines how honor, stigma and social norms arise from individuals'...