We develop a dynamic principal-agent model to show how imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs about payoff-relevant parameters, agency conflicts, and the agent's implicit incentives to influence the principal's posterior beliefs through his unobservable actions interact to affect...

We develop a dynamic principal-agent model to show how imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs about payoff-relevant parameters, agency conflicts, and the agent's implicit incentives to influence the principal's posterior beliefs through his unobservable actions interact to affect...

In this paper, the optimal timing for investing in high speed rail projects under uncertainty in relation to the utility provided to railway users was investigated. To accomplish this, a continuous time real options analysis framework using a stochastic demand model was developed to determine...

Instructional presentation slides.What drives innovation, risk taking, and investment booms? We study these phenomena using a model of decision making by firms that make biased observations of prior returns. We assume that firms are more likely to observe large successes than small successes or...

For serial multi-echelon systems subject to production capacity limits at every stage, we consider a class of modified echelon base stock (MEBS) policies. To evaluate information requirements of such systems, we consider two separate inventory management mechanisms operated in a decentralized...

Firms spend substantial resources on marketing and selling. Interpreting this as evidence of frictions in product markets, which require firms to spend resources on customer acquisition, this paper develops a search theoretic model of firm dynamics in frictional product markets. Introducing...

We consider the provision of venture capital in a dynamic model with multiple research stages, where time and investment needed to meet each benchmark are unknown. The allocation of funds is subject moral hazard. The optimal contract provides for incentive payments linked to attaining the next...

We present a dynamic model of venture capital financing, described as a sequential investment problem with uncertain outcome. Each venture has a critical, but unknown threshold beyond which it cannot progress. If the threshold is reached before the completion of the project, then the project...

Investment in physical capital at the micro level is infrequent and large, or lumpy. The most common explanation for this is that firms face non-convex physical adjustment costs. The model developed in this paper shows that information costs make investment lumpy at the micro level, even in the...

Pour une entreprise, le maintien d’une croissance soutenue pendant une longue période est délicat. Il suppose, outre des conditions de marché favorables, un pilotage du rythme de développement adapté aux contraintes financières.