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Farmland values and bidder behavior in first-price land auctions

Croonenbroeck, Carsten; Odening, Martin; Hüttel, Silke - Agricultural Land Markets - Efficiency and Regulation - 2018

Within this paper, we aim to investigate asymmetries among bidders in land auctions that may entail non-competitive prices. Using representative data for Eastern Germany including winning bids, bidder characteristics, and land amenities, we pursue a structural approach to derive distributions of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012012400

Common values and unobserved heterogeneity in farmland auctions in Germany

Seifert, Stefan; Hüttel, Silke - Agricultural Land Markets - Efficiency and Regulation - 2020

In this paper, we test for the existence of a common component in agricultural land auctions in eastern Germany during the price boom 2007-2018 and discuss respective policy implications. Using a large, detailed dataset of auctions, we can rely on professional appraisals of the auctioned good...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012165347

Nonparametric Estimation of Sponsored Search Auctions and Impacts of Ad Quality on Search Revenue

Kim, Dongwoo; Pal, Pallavi - 2023

information’ assumption. The ad value is characterized by a tractable analytical solution given observed auction parameters. Using … Yahoo! search auction data, we estimate value distributions and study the bidding behavior across product categories. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014259686

Cyber-Shilling in Automobile Auctions : Evidence from a Field Experiment

Grether, David M. - 2017

price. Using two diverse auction sites, one in New York and one in Texas, we find that buyer and seller behavior differs …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012960800

'Vettes and Lemons on Ebay

Adams, Christopher - 2006

used car. One implication is that a rational bidder will bid late in the auction in order to reduce the likelihood of other … reduce the likelihood of winning the auction because her private information is incorrect (the winner's curse). We test the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012734532

Effects of Minimum Bid Increment in Internet Auctions : Evidence from a Field Experiment

Tukiainen, Janne - 2015

I study the role of minimum bid increments (MBI) in internet auctions using field experiment data. I sell identical gift cards while varying the MBI. Internet auctions have typically been viewed as second-price, implying truthful bidding. However, due to the presence of the MBI, equilibrium...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014156461

Robust inference in first-price auctions : experimental findings as identifying restrictions

Grundl, Serafin; Zhu, Yu - 2019

overbidding puzzle, but no canonical alternative to RNBNE has emerged, and RNBNE remains the basis of the structural auction …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012017494

On Efficiency of the English Auction

Birulin, Oleksii; Izmalkov, Sergei - 2003

We study efficiency properties of the irrevocable exit English auction in a setting with interdependent values. Maskin … (1992) shows that the pairwise single-crossing condition is both necessary and sufficient for efficiency of the English … auction with two bidders. This paper extends both Maskin's result and the single-crossing condition to the case of N bidders …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014074392

Dissolving Multi-Partnerships Efficiently

Yenmez, M. Bumin - 2012

I study a market where agents with jointly owned heterogeneous goods trade subject to the constraint that each agent ends up with one good. In this market the existence of an efficient, incentive compatible, individually rational and budget balanced mechanism depends on the shares of the agents....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014048103

How risk sharing may enhance efficiency in English auctions

Hu, Audrey; Offerman, Theo; Zou, Liang - 2014

We investigate the possibility of enhancing efficiency by awarding premiums to a set of highest bidders in an English … auction - in a setting that extends Maskin and Riley (1984, Econometrica 52: 1473-1518) in three aspects: (i) the seller can … be risk averse, (ii) the bidders can have heterogeneous risk preferences, and (iii) the auction can have a binding …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010234599