We present results from experiments containing incentivized school-choice scenarios. In these scenarios, we vary whether schools’ assessments of students are based on a common priority (inducing correlation in admissions decisions) or are based on independent assessments (eliminating...

In a centralized marketplace that was designed to be simple, we identify participants whose choices are dominated. Using administrative data from Hungary, we show that college applicants make obvious mistakes: they forgo the free opportunity to receive a tuition waiver worth thousands of...

Stability and "no justified envy" are used almost synonymously in the matching theory literature. However, they are conceptually different and have logically separate properties. We generalize the definition of justified envy to environments with arbitrary school preferences, feasibility...

We review the process of redesigning the Israeli Psychology Masters Match (IPMM), with special attention given to the fellowships granted by the departments and the interplay between different programs within the same department. These features make the IPMM a two-sided matching with contracts...

Although many centralized school assignment systems use strategically simple mechanisms, applicants often make dominated choices. Using administrative data from Hungary, we show that many college applicants forgo the free opportunity to receive a tuition waiver. Using two empirical strategies,...

We present direct field evidence of preference misrepresentation under deferred acceptance. A large fraction of highly educated participants, who had been informed about the strategy-proof nature of the mechanism in numerous ways, failed to play truthfully: they ranked a non-funded position...