We develop a finite random assignment model where players know either their cardinal or their ordinal preferences and may make cardinal or ordinal reports to an assignment mechanism. Under truthful reporting, we find that all mechanisms that disregard the cardinal information in players' reports...

When a decision maker is a member of multiple social groups, her actions may cause information to to spill over from one group to another. We study the nature of these spillovers in an observational learning game where two groups interact via a common player, and where conventions emerge when...

Economic partners – like masters and apprentices – produce benefits for each other. Yet, they are often subject to contracting limitations that restrict their actions, and thus the benefits they produce and receive. We characterize the relationship between (contracting) limitations and...

This paper reports the results of an experiment on information spillovers between groups. We find that a player who is a member of multiple groups aggregates information and serves as a conduit through which information from one group spills over to another. We also find that such players are...