Influenced by their compensation plans, CEOs make their own luck through decisions that affect future firm risk. After adopting a relative performance evaluation (RPE) plan, total and idiosyncratic risk are higher, and the correlation between firm and industry performance is lower. The opposite...

This paper provides the first study of compensation and pay-for-performance for top executives at non-profit endowments and foundations. Using detailed IRS filings over the 2009-2017 period, we find that pay packages of Chief Investment Officers (CIOs) depend more heavily on bonuses than do...

This paper proposes to exploit a reform in legal rules of corporate governance to identify contractual incentives from the correlation of executive pay and firm performance. In particular, we refer to a major shift in the legal and institutional environment, the reform of the German joint-stock...

The results of this paper add significant contributions to the earlier findings that investigated various incentives to CEO's, contingent on future returns. This paper chooses a long time horizon, and revisits the challenges of aligning CEO Compensation with Performance and Shareholders' best...

In the present paper, we analyze two effective non-traditional performance-based stock option schemes which we call Parisian and constrained Asian executives' stock option plans. Both options have a criterion on the terminal value similar to a call option, but in addition impose a restriction on...

We examine the robustness of empirical models and findings concerning CEO turnover. We show that the sensitivity of turnover to abnormal firm performance is an extremely robust result. In contrast, evidence indicating a relation between turnover and industry performance is both weak and fragile....