services per year, we leverage our characterization of the optimal mechanism to study the design of first-price-auction …

We investigate the impact of using a clear scoring rule in a sealed bid multi-dimensional (A+B) procurement auction, as …

though the fees themselves implicitly reduce competition at the auction stage. We also highlight that admission fees and … and Klemperer (1996) that market thickness often takes precedence over market power in auction design …

I study multi-unit auction design when bidders have private values, multi-unit demands, and non-quasilinear preferences …. Without quasilinearity, the Vickrey auction loses its desired incentive and efficiency properties. I give conditions under … which we can design a mechanism that retains the Vickrey auction’s desirable incentive and efficiency properties: (1 …

Suppose that in a second-price auction, a seller wishes to set an optimal reserve price, but the information about the …

to flat securities. To extract information rents, the optimal securities auction involves a contingent cash payment; and …