increasingly used today. We develop a reverse auction which accounts for particularities of intermittent renewable energy sources … auctions. We analyze incentives for bidders to manipulate the auction outcome and adapt the design to prevent this behavior …

We study efficient auction design for a single indivisible object when bidders have interdependent values and non … bad setting (i.e. a procurement auction) there is no mechanism that has an ex post efficient equilibrium if the level of …

though the fees themselves implicitly reduce competition at the auction stage. We also highlight that admission fees and … and Klemperer (1996) that market thickness often takes precedence over market power in auction design …

transactions. Yet the predictions of the theory on the impact of this hybrid mechanism on auction outcomes have not been tested … using real-world transaction data. Hence, our knowledge of the practical economic impact of this hybrid auction that … sale of government owned land in Taiwan from 2007 to 2010. The main findings are as follows. An auction with the ROFR has …

Suppose that in a second-price auction, a seller wishes to set an optimal reserve price, but the information about the …

auction’s desired incentive and efficiency properties without quasilinearity. While a fully efficient mechanism is impossible …, we show that any undominated outcome of the Vickrey auction has a negligible inefficiency when bidder wealth effects are … sufficiently small. In order to show this, we first place bounds on undominated bid behavior in the Vickrey auction when bidders …

services per year, we leverage our characterization of the optimal mechanism to study the design of first-price-auction …