Problem definition: After autonomous vehicles (AVs) are deployed for ride-hailing platforms but before their costs decrease enough to push human drivers off the road entirely, human drivers will compete for rides with AVs. We consider a ride-hailing platform’s strategy to recruit human drivers...

We analyze an optimal electric vehicle (EV) fleet and charging infrastructure capacity planning problem in a spatial setting. As customer requests arrive at rate λ, the system operator must determine the minimum number of vehicles and chargers for a given service level along with a matching and...

We study how a profit-maximizing firm prioritizes its supply in a “hybrid marketplace” composed of both private and flexible supply agents. The firm can choose how many private agents to operate and pays them regardless of their work. Flexible agents, on the other hand, make their own...

This paper studies how the potential introduction of autonomous vehicles (AVs) in a fleet of human drivers (HVs) may impact the quality of service and the equality of access to transportation on ride-hailing platforms. We formulate a game-theoretical queueing model in which a platform aims to...

Motivated in part by online marketplaces such as ridesharing and freelancing platforms, we study two-sided matching markets where agents are heterogeneous in their compatibility with different types of jobs: flexible agents can fulfill any job, whereas each specialized agent can only be matched...

We study the relationship between capacity and performance for a service firm with spatial operations, in the sense that requests arrive with origin-destination pairs. An example of such a system is a ride-hailing platform in which each customer arrives in the system with the need to travel from...

Two very different contractual structures are commonly observed inservice industries with congestion effects: service level guarantees(SLGs) and best effort (BE) service. We analyze the impact of thesecontractual agreements on market outcomes in oligopolistic industries.First, we consider a...

We propose an approximation method for analyzing Ericson and Pakes (1995)-style dynamic models of imperfect competition. We develop a simple algorithm for computing an ``oblivious equilibrium,'' in which each firm is assumed to make decisions based only on its own state and knowledge of the long...