Mechanism design under approximate incentive compatibility
Year of publication: |
2024
|
---|---|
Authors: | Balseiro, Santiago R. ; Besbes, Omar ; Castro, Francisco |
Published in: |
Operations research. - Linthicum, Md. : INFORMS, ISSN 1526-5463, ZDB-ID 2019440-7. - Vol. 72.2024, 1, p. 355-372
|
Subject: | approximate incentive compatibility | duality | infinite dimensional linear programs | mechanism design | Optimization | revenue maximization | satisficing behavior | Mathematische Optimierung | Mathematical programming | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design |
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