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information to agents, who consider joining a coalition. The agents' actions can cause harm by contributing to a public bad. The … coalition size, as a function of beliefs of agents, is an endogenous variable, induced by the information sender. The optimal … information mechanism from the general set of public information mechanisms, in coalition formation games is derived. I also apply …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011660390
integrated with climate dynamics, a grand climate coalition or multiple climate coalitions may form in equilibrium, but if the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013205091
We analyze the formation of self-enforcing international environmental agreements under the assumption that countries announce their participation either simultaneously or sequentially. It is shown that a sequential formation process opens up possibilities for strategic behavior of countries...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014066079
This paper studies the problem of endogenous coalition formation in contests: how players organize themselves in groups … settings. Efficiency gains are said to be generated if any coalition experiences increasing marginal returns with aggregate … a sequential coalition formation game for an arbitrary number of symmetric players and exogenous effort. If coalitions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013294669
Increasing concerns about climate change have given rise to the formation of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) as a possible solution to limit global pollution effects. In this paper, we study the stability of IEAs in a repeated game framework where we restrict to strategies which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011332824
We investigate whether global cooperation for emission abatement can be improved if asymmetric countries can sign different parallel environmental agreements. The analysis assumes a two-stage game theoretical model. Conditions for self-enforcing sets of agreements and the resulting total...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011283164
This paper examines the effects of political pressure groups (lobbies) on the emissions abatement decisions of countries and on the stability of international environmental agreements. We consider two types of lobbies, industry and environmentalists. We determine the influence of lobby-groups on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011517964
This paper studies within a multi-country model with international trade the stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) when countries regulate carbon emissions either by taxes or caps. Regardless of whether coalitions play Nash or are Stackelberg leaders the principal message is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010483270
We augment the standard cartel formation game from non-cooperative coalition theory, often applied in the context of … international environmental agreements on climate change, with the possibility that singletons support coalition formation without … becoming coalition members themselves. Rather, their support takes the form of a monetary transfer to the coalition, which …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011444079
In this paper we analyze how ratification uncertainty impacts the optimal terms of international environmental agreements (IEAs). We relax the frequent assumption of countries as unitary actors by modeling the ratification stage through uncertain preferences of a ratifying agent (e.g. the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010339399