In the absence of an international environmental agreement (IEA) on climate change, a country may be reluctant to unilaterally implement environmental actions, as this may lead to the relocation of firms to other, lax-on-pollution countries. To avoid this problem, while still taking care of the...

The aim of this paper is to propose a method to stabilize the rapid variations on the value of government bonds issued by the States, using Game Theory. In particular, we focus our attention on three players: a large speculative bank (hereinafter called Speculator), having immediate access to...

Our article develops a game theory model of interaction between speculative and hedging behaviors in the oil and US dollar markets, in the presence of a severe taxation on speculative financial transactions. From this microeconomic analysis, we derive a regulatory policy. This policy has two...

We study a carrier–retailer channel and examine the profitability of the centralized and decentralized channels under price-sensitive demand. In the centralized channel, the problem is to set the retail price that maximizes the total channel profit, whereas in the decentralized channel the...

This paper examines the complexity of the current negotiations to avert climate change under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Drawing on economic game theory modelling, it interprets the latest developments within the international negotiations and provides a political...

We present the first general positive result on the construction of collusion-resistant mechanisms, that is, mechanisms that guarantee dominant strategies even when agents can form arbitrary coalitions and exchange compensations (sometimes referred to as transferable utilities or side payments)....

For our experiment on corruption, we designed a coordination game to model the influence of risk attitudes, beliefs, and information on behavioral choices and determined the equilibria. We observed that the risk attitude of the participant failed to explain their choices between corrupt and...

This paper investigates the pricing and production game in a decentralized assembly system that consists of one assembler and two independent suppliers. One supplier is able to exert the push contract on the assembler so as to transfer all his inventory risk, while the other supplier has to...

Retailers have an incentive to cooperate in the form of group buying (GB) when a supplier provides quantity discounts, because wholesale price under GB depends on total purchasing quantity rather than individual purchasing (IP) quantity. Most previous studies on GB focus on the benefits that...

In this paper, we develop a newsvendor model in which the retailer gives “free” gift cards to consumers who purchase a regularly priced product at the end of the selling season instead of discounting the product. The model is developed for a market with patient consumers. We derive the...