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Relative Performance Evaluation in CEO Compensation : A Talent-Retention Explanation

De Angelis, David - 2019

Relative performance evaluation (RPE) in CEO compensation can be used as a commitment device to pay CEOs for their revealed relative talent. We find evidence consistent with the talent-retention hypothesis, using two different approaches. First, we examine the RPE terms in compensation contracts...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012904916

Are Top Management Teams Compensated as Teams? A Structural Modeling Approach

Li, Chen - 2019

. The results favor the team perspective under which unilateral shirking is assumed infeasible for managers. The analysis …-based measures of agency costs. The risk premium can explain up to 37% of total compensation for higher-paid managers in large firms …. This upper bound is higher than that of lower-paid managers and all managers in small firms. Shareholders could experience …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012899926

Do Executive Compensation Contracts Maximize Firm Value? Indications from a Quasi-Natural Experiment

Abudy, Menachem (Meni) - 2019

We find significant positive abnormal returns surrounding a surprising and quick enactment of a law that restricts executive pay to a binding upper limit in a few industries. We find that the effect is concentrated only for firms in which the restriction is binding. We also find that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012901655

Shareholder Governance and CEO Compensation : The Peer Effects of Say on Pay

Denis, Diane K. - 2019

We document that firms whose compensation peers experience weak say on pay votes reduce CEO compensation following those votes. Reductions reflect proxy adviser concerns about peers' compensation contracts and are stronger when CEOs receive excess compensation, when they compete more closely...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012902356

Inducement Grants, Hiring Announcements and Adverse Selection for New CEOs

Cadman, Brian D. - 2019

We examine how adverse selection problems when hiring new external CEOs affect contractual features of inducement grants. Focusing on the sensitivity of inducement grants to the new CEO announcement return ($Sensitivity), we find that firms provide inducement grants that are more sensitive to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012903264

The Relationship between Total Management Team (TMT) Compensation and Corporate Governance : The Case of Saudi Stock Market

Altuwaijri, Basmah - 2017

This research aims to evaluate emergent or new dimensions of corporate governance (CG) practice in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as demonstrated by selected companies listed in the Saudi stock exchange. The research seeks to enrich existing literature in the field for best practice and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012966815

Career Concerns and 'Unpaid' Executives

Chen, Hui - 2016

A significant portion of CEOs in publicly-listed Chinese state-owned enterprises receive zero pay from the companies for which they work. Instead, they are paid directly by their controlling shareholder, which can be the Chinese government or parent firms that are controlled by the Chinese...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012985292

How Well Does Agency Theory Explain Executive Compensation?

Gayle, George-Levi - 2020

As the share of all income going to the top 1 percent has risen over the past four decades, so has the share of top incomes coming from labor income relative to capital income. The rise in labor income is mainly due to the explosion in executive compensation over the same periodâ€”mostly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012851831

Payday Before Mayday : CEO Compensation Contracting for Distressed Firms

Carter, Mary Ellen - 2020

realignment of managers with relevant stakeholders of distressed firms …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012851901

Identifying Opportunistic Managers Using Non-GAAP Disclosure and Insider Trading

Black, Dirk E.; Gao, Bo - 2022

by high-ability managers; and, 3) Disclose non-GAAP earnings more aggressively. Importantly, we also find that these … insider sales enable managers to avoid statistically significant negative abnormal returns. Our research demonstrates the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014244933