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Globalization of monitoring practices : the case of American influences on the dismissal risk of European CEOs

Oxelheim, Lars; Randøy, Trond - 2013

This study examines globalization of monitoring practices by focusing on how American (U.S.) influences on European firms impact the dismissal risk for these firms' CEOs. Specifically, we argue that the stronger short term orientation of the American corporate governance system increase the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009721271

What Does CEOs' Pay-for-Performance Reveal About Shareholders' Attitude Toward Earnings Overstatements?

Guthrie, Katherine; Kwon, Illoong; Sokolowsky, Jan - 2015

If overstatements were a symptom of the agency conflict, pay-for-performance sensitivities should have increased in response to the additional penalties for misreporting imposed by SOX. Our finding of their decrease is inconsistent with the view that overstatements were an unintended consequence...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014204131

Testing the Effects of Capital Structure on Entrepreneurial Effort

Wu, Yan Wendy - 2020

Do entrepreneurs work less or harder when they borrow more? This paper tests how entrepreneurial effort is affected by the firm's financing choice. In line with the typical agency theory prediction, entrepreneur effort is negatively related to the magnitude of equity financing. Furthermore,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012857510

Comparing CEO Employment Contract Provisions : Differences between Australia and the U.S

Hill, Jennifer G. - 2020

imbalance between managers and shareholders. A comparative analysis of the kind undertaken in our study provides an additional …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012857530

Restatements, Managerial Learning, and Optimal Reporting Bias

Herly, Marie - 2019

rational managers engage in misreporting, in spite of the costly consequences. We present a simple extension to the Fischer and … in the reputation costs observed after a restatement, such that managers only reduce future bias if the observed cost of … based on more restatements. Our results indicate that rational managers use the insights from prior restatements to improve …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012858313

CEO Incentive Contracts, Risk Shifting, and Commitment Benefits of Gender Diverse Boards

Nanda, Vikram K. - 2020

We argue gender-diverse boards are associated with distinct preferences that reassure investors about their commitment to moderate risk and boost long-term corporate survival. Results suggest a strong relation between gender-diverse boards and bondholder-aligned CEO compensation components,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012849311

Managerial Incentives and Investment Policy in Family Firms : Evidence from a Structural Analysis

Mazur, Mieszko - 2018

undiversified managers. After controlling for factors that affect incentive pay and investment policy simultaneously, we find that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012916285

Determinants and Consequences of Chief Information Officer Equity Incentives

Sanchez, Juan Manuel - 2018

The chief information officer (CIO) is responsible for bridging the gap between two critical domains—technology and business, making the CIO's job uniquely different from other executives. As digital technologies become increasingly important to firms' competitive success, boards of directors...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012917256

Is Executive Compensation a Substitute Governance Mechanism to Debt Financing and Leasing?

Minhat, Marizah - 2017

This study examines whether and how CEO equity incentives relate to financing choices (i.e., debt and leases). Using manually collected CEO compensation and lease data for a sample of large UK firms, we found evidence of a negative relationship between CEO equity incentives and firm leverage. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012976429

What Do We Know About Executive Compensation at Small Privately Held Firms?

Cole, Rebel A. - 2016

We examine executive compensation using data from two nationally representative samples of small privately held U.S. corporations conducted ten years apart — in 1993 and 2003. We find that executive pay at small privately held firms increases with firm size and varies widely by industry,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013003089