Lobbying is a potential source of corruption but is also a valuable source of information for policymakers. We analyze a game-theoretic model that shows how the threat of corruption affects the incentives of non-corrupt politicians to enlist the help of lobbyists to make more informed decisions....

Campaign finance contributions may influence policy by affecting elections or influencing the choices of politicians once in office. To study the trade-offs between these two paths to influence, we use a game in which contributions may affect electoral outcomes and signal policy-relevant...

We provide a model of dark money in elections. An ideologically extreme donor with private information about candidate ideology and quality can advertise on behalf of a candidate. Advertising reveals information about candidate quality to voters, who can learn from either donor-funded or neutral...

We study the consequences of campaign finance disclosure laws in a model of informative campaign finance. Campaign spending can affect electoral outcomes and also signal policy information to politicians. Under mandatory disclosure donors may engage in spending that runs counter to their...

Ex post review is a common feature of policymaking institutions. We consider a simple environment in which an expert agent makes a policy recommendation, which can then be accepted or rejected by a principal whose policy goals differ from those of the agent. The theory offers testable...

How does the scope of review affect bureaucratic policymaking incentives? To explore this ques-tion, I consider a simple policymaking environment in which an expert agency develops policythat is upheld or overturned by an overseer who may have different policy goals. The agencycan affect the...

We develop a theory of policymaking between a principal, an agent, and an overseer. The agent increases the overall quality of policy outcomes through costly capacity investments. Oversight impacts agent investment incentives, but only if the policy bias of the agent does as well. The principal...