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Cisternas, Gonzalo; Kolb, Aaron - 2022

We study dynamic signaling when the informed party does not observe the signals generated by her actions. A forward-looking sender signals her type continuously over time to a myopic receiver who privately monitors her behavior; in turn, the receiver transmits his private inferences back through...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013310444

Community Structure and Market Outcomes : A Repeated Games in Networks Approach

Fainmesser, Itay P - 2010

Consider a large market with asymmetric information, in which sellers choose whether to cooperate or deviate and cheat their buyers, and buyers decide whether to re-purchase from different sellers. We model active trade relationships as links in a buyer-seller network and suggest a framework for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014044669

Repeated trade with imperfect information about previous transactions

Dilmé, Francesc - 2024

This paper studies repeated trade with noisy information about previous transactions. A buyer has private information about his willingness to pay, which is either low or high, and buys goods from different sellers over time. Each seller observes a noisy history of signals about the buyer's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014520857

Coordination in evolving networks with endogenous decay

Feri, Francesco; Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A. - 2009

direct and indirect connections. In addition to forming (costly) links, agents choose actions for a coordination game that … determines the level of decay of each link. We address the issues of coordination (long-run equilibrium selection) and network … risk-dominance play a crucial role in the long-run behavior of the system. -- coordination ; networks ; risk …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009735339

Coordination in evolving networks with endogenous decay

Feri, Francesco; Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A. - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008657634

Bayesian repeated games and reputations

Forges, Françoise; Salomon, Antoine - 2014

Under appropriate assumptions (private values and uniform punishments), the Nash equilibria of a Bayesian repeated game without discounting are payoff-equivalent to tractable, completely revealing, equilibria and can be achieved as interim cooperative solutions of the initial Bayesian game. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010256693

Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring

Sugaya, Takuo - 2013

We show that the folk theorem with individually rational payoffs defined by pure strategies generically holds for a general N-player repeated game with private monitoring when the number of each player's signals is sufficiently large. No cheap talk communication device or public randomization...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013093673

Equilibrium Characterization of Repeated Games with Private Monitoring

Gao, Lei - 2019

This paper examines sequential equilibria of repeated games with private monitoring where signals are generally distributed. Assuming full dimensionality of payoffs and identifiability conditions of signals, we focus on games with finite stage-game actions and signals. We can construct a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012903241

Bayesian Repeated Games and Reputation

Forges, Francoise - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013055418

Fighting collusion : an implementation theory approach

Azacis, Helmuts; Vida, Péter - 2021

A competition authority has an objective, which specifies what output profile firms need to produce as a function of production costs. These costs change over time and are only known by the firms. The objective is implementable if inequilibrium, the firms cannot collude on their reports to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012602309