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The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games
Anderlini, Luca; Gerardi, Dino; Lagunoff, Roger - 2004
A canonical interpretation of an infinitely repeated game is that of a dynastic repeated game: a stage game repeatedly played by successive generations of finitely-lived players with dynastic preferences. These two models are in fact equivalent when the past history of play is observable to all...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014068394
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Communication, Renegotiation and Coordination with Private Values
Heller, Yuval; Kuzmics, Christoph - 2021
characterize the set of equilibria of coordination games with pre-play communication in which players have private preferences over …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013210917
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Renegotiation and Coordination with Private Values
Heller, Yuval - 2020
We define and characterize the set of renegotiation-proof equilibria of coordination games with pre-play communication …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012847894
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Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring
Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) 3, pp. 311-340
Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599373
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Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2004
Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public-monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762684
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Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2004
Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public-monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005102089
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Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2004
Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005109597
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Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
Morris, Stephen; Mailath, George J - Society for Economic Dynamics - SED - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051332
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Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2004
Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public-monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593480
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Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring
Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) 3, pp. 311-340
Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005730970