We analyze a simple dynamic durable good oligopoly model where sellers are capacity constrained. Two incumbent sellers and potential entrants choose their capacities at the start of the game. We solve for equilibrium capacity choices and the (necessarily mixed) pricing strategies. In...

We examine the effect of a capacity constraint on the profits of a durable goods monopoly (DGM) in a two-period model when rationing is efficient. For sufficiently high discount factors, output rises through time without a constraint and a constraint increases the DGM profits: it restricts...

New Internet-based markets enable consumer/owners to rent out their durable goods when not using them. Such markets are modeled to determine ownership, rental rates, quantities, and surplus generated. Both the short run, before consumers can revise their ownership decisions, and the long run, in...

Entrepreneurs have created a number of new Internet-based platforms that enable owners to rent out their durable goods when not using them for personal consumption. We develop a model of these kinds of markets in order to analyze the determinants of ownership, rental rates, quantities, and the...

The existing literature on mergers in durable goods industries suggests that such mergers will produce much less harm to consumer welfare in the first few years following the merger than mergers in non-durable goods industries, particularly if the pre-merger stock can be kept in service for a...

We examine a durable goods monopolist's optimal dynamic price and product quality strategy when buyers are rational, have diverse tastes, and can trade used durables among themselves. Our analysis makes four main points. First, in contrast to the well-known time-inconsistency problem of the...

Price markups over marginal cost are often higher on "aftermarket" parts and services for durable goods than they are on the goods themselves. A popular explanation is that the aftermarket good is used as a "metering" device. This paper explores what happens in the metering model as foremarket...

We analyze a model of multi-period monopoly in durable goods. Taking into consideration the special conditions of software markets, we assume that there are no used software markets and that manufacturers stop selling older software when they introduce a replacement model. We show that nominal...

This note re-examines the previous results on durable goods monopolists under the time inconsistency problem that the firm tends to make its goods less compatible as a “planned obsolescence” strategy in the presence of network effects. We find that the possibility of the commitment to...