We document an economically significant relation between director turnover and prior firm performance. This relation manifests in idiosyncratic stock returns consistent with relative performance evaluation and the monitoring of actions attributable to directors. The director turnover-performance...

By examining board appointments of outside directors who have previously fired a CEO, we study how directors' intolerance of failure influences firm performance and risk-taking. Such directors appear to benefit firms with weak monitoring, but hurt firms in innovative industries. Firms appointing...

We model a corporate board evaluating a CEO of uncertain management ability. Each director receives a noisy private signal about CEO ability, after which directors discuss this ability and vote to retain or replace the CEO. Directors care about true CEO ability, since it affects their equity...

CEOs of public (listed) firms earn more than their counterparts in similar private (unlisted) firms. This can either be because rent extraction is easier in public firms than in private firms, or because managing a public firm involves more legal and institutional responsibilities than managing...

This study examines the effect of busy directors and boards on the value of a set of international firms from 1999-2012. We find that busy directors and boards are a global phenomenon. We discover that national culture helps to explain the cross-sectional variation in director and board...

This paper studies the effect on company performance of appointing non-executive directors that are also executive directors in other firms. The analysis is based on a new panel dataset of UK companies over 2002-2008. Our findings suggest a positive relationship between the presence of these...

This paper analyzes the reputational effects of forced CEO turnovers on outside directors. Directors interlocked to a forced CEO turnover experience large and persistent increases in withheld votes at subsequent re-elections relative to non-turnover-interlocked directors. Reputational losses are...

This study investigates a communication game between a CEO and a board of directors where the CEO's career concerns can potentially impede value-increasing informative communication. By adopting a policy of aggressive boards (excessive replacement), shareholders can facilitate communication...

Exploiting the 2009 amendments to Regulation S-K, we provide unique evidence on the first-time disclosure of the reasons firms state for combining (separating) the roles of CEO and chairman. The stated reasons support both agency theory and organization theory. They are more numerous and...