We examine the effects of corporate board characteristics on the use of performance pricing in debt contracts. Performance pricing is a recent innovation that plays a role in addressing some debt contracting problems by linking the ex-ante pricing of debt with ex-post firm performance. Results...

In this paper I rectify the market governance model of Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) to develop and test a number of hypotheses concerning company board structure and incentives. Exogeneity stems from the forced departure of "non-independent" directors with substantial shareholdings from boards...

Extensive research finds that shareholder and CEO preferences affect demand for director services. We find a large body of evidence that independent director reputation incentives influence the supply of director services. These reputation incentives vary across firms and over time,...

We find that the most common board size for US publicly-traded firms ranges from eight to eleven directors. Over time, small boards (seven or fewer directors), tend to increase their size, but large boards (12 or more directors), tend to shrink their size. This result suggests a significant mean...

Board composition and role have been under close scrutiny both in the academic and "civil" worlds. Independence has been advocated as a way to reinforce the board's power over the managers. However, the empirical literature does not find convincing results to support this view. This paper offers...

Pothers about liability risks for company directors and officers are nothing new in corporate law. The global financial crisis, however, created a unique and unfamiliar commercial matrix in which such concerns were played out. Although Australia fared better than many jurisdictions during the...

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to determine whether the Board Neutrality Rule and the primacy afforded to shareholders during takeovers is justified under common law and policy.Design/Methodology/Approach – The paper provides a detailed assessment of the role play by the board...

In this paper I rectify the market governance model of Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) to develop and test a number of hypotheses concerning company board structure and incentives. Exogeneity stems from the forced departure of "non-independent" directors with substantial shareholdings from boards...

In this paper I rectify the market governance model of Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) to develop and test a number of hypotheses concerning company board structure and incentives. Exogeneity stems from the forced departure of "non-independent" directors with substantial shareholdings from boards...