Previous research has established that the predictions made by game theory about strategic behavior in incomplete information games are quite sensitive to the assumptions made about the players’ infinite hierarchies of beliefs. We evaluate the severity of this robustness problem by...

We study the information design problem in a single-unit auction setting. The information designer controls independent private signals according to which the buyers infer their binary private value. Assuming that the seller adopts Myerson (1981) optimal auction in response, we characterize both...

Customer behavior is often assumed to follow weak rationality, which implies that adding a product to an assortment will not increase the choice probability of another product in that assortment. However, an increasing amount of research has revealed that customers are not necessarily rational...

This paper studies a matching algorithm which is termed incomplete-information deferred acceptance (DA). We show that DA is finite and that it produces a stable market state. We also compare DA with algorithms in the literature, including the complete-information Gale-Shapley algorithm, the...

We study whether and how banks’ social performance affects depositors, who hold demandable debt with pervasive government protection. Exploiting the regulatory releases of bank performance ratings for community development and a difference-in-differences design, we find a decline in deposit...

This paper extends the Bayesian stability notion of Liu (2020) to define the Bayesian stability of a market state , which consists of a matching outcome and an information structure. Here, the information structure can be arbitrarily heterogeneous among agents. We first establish that Liu’s...