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Asymmetry of Reputation Loss and Recovery under Endogenous Partnerships : Theory and Evidence
Fujiwara-Greve, Takako - 2014
This paper is inspired by real-world phenomena that firms lose customers based on imprecise information and take a long time to recover. If consumers are playing an ordinary repeated game with fixed partners, there is no clear reason why recovery slowly happens. However, if consumers are playing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013070352
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Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring
Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 1 (2006) 3, pp. 311-340
Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702996
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Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - 2005
Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public-monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014070123
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Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring, Second Version
Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - 2005
Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014066076
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Starting small to communicate
Atakan, Alp; Koçkesen, Levent; Kubilay, Elif - 2018
We analyze a repeated cheap-talk game in which the receiver is privately informed about the conflict of interest between herself and the sender and either the sender or the receiver controls the stakes involved in their relationship. We focus on payoff-dominant equilibria that satisfy a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011795331
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Central banks, trade unions and reputation – is there room for an expansionist manoeuvre in the European Union?
Pusch, Toralf; Heise, Arne - 2008
dramatically if the game is repeated. This allows for effects on the trade union's reputation. It can be shown that this, in turn …, improves the likelihood of employment expansion. -- Monetary Policy ; Labour unions ; Reputation building ; Employment ; EMU …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008663759
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Flexibility and Reputation in Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma Games
Honhon, Dorothee - 2015
. While cooperation is, in theory, sustainable with or without this option, we show experimentally that cooperation rates are … relationship, which increases the temptation to behave opportunistically. However, we show that introducing a reputation mechanism … objective, long-lasting measure of reputation is the most effective in promoting cooperation, but short-lasting or subjective …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013028451
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Signaling and tacit collusion in an in finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
Harrington, Joseph Emmett; Zhao, Wei - 2011 - August 2010, Revised May 2011
In the context of an infinitely repeated Prisoners.Dilemma, we explore how cooperation is initiated when players signal and coordinate through their actions. There are two types of players - patient and impatient - and a player's type is private information. An impatient type is incapable of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009486361
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Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games
Fudenberg, Drew; Yamamoto, Yuichi - 2010
We study the perfect type-contingently public ex-post equilibrium (PTXE) of repeated games with incomplete information where players observe imperfect public signals of the actions and the map from actions to signal distributions is itself unknown. The PTXE payoffs when players are patient are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014189386
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Discounted and Finitely Repeated Minority Games with Public Signals
Renault, Jerome - 2012
We consider a repeated game where at each stage players simultaneously choose one of the two rooms. The players who choose the less crowded room are rewarded with one euro. The players in the same room do not recognize each other, and between the stages only the current majority room is publicly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013109401