I provide causal empirical evidence of how changes in the bargaining power of CEOs affect CEO compensation. Using the staggered rejections of previously adopted Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (IDD) by US state courts to capture an exogenous increase in CEOs’ bargaining power, I find that the...

This paper assesses whether reducing ‘readability' is an effective obfuscation strategy for influencing the level of shareholder say-on-pay voting dissent in firms with excessive CEO pay. Based on a sample of UK-listed firms, our results indicate that in cases of excessive CEO pay, a less...

This study examines the effect of the exogenous increase in the presence of female directors on FTSE350 corporate boards in the UK, as mandated by the Davies Report (2011), on the association between earnings management and CEO incentive compensation. We use a hand-collected dataset of FTSE350...

The negative effects of common ownership on competition have received significant attention, but many proposed mechanisms for institutional investor influence seem implausible. We develop and test an analytical model of optimal compensation in an oligopoly with common ownership, focusing on...

Golden parachutes have attracted much debate and substantial attention from investors and public officials for more than two decades, and the Dodd-Frank Act mandated a shareholder vote on any future adoption of a golden parachute by public firms. We analyze the relationship that golden...

This study investigates dynamics and convergence in CEO pay in Australias largest corporations over an 18 year period. Utilizing dynamic panel estimators, we find that CEO pay is driven by dynamic adjustments, firm size, board size, CEO tenure and firm performance. The largest pay-performance...