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Pure equilibria of repeated games with public observation

Tomala, Tristan - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 27 (1998) 1, pp. 93-109

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001437789

Belief-free communication equilibria in repeated games

Tomala, Tristan - In: Mathematics of operations research 38 (2013) 4, pp. 617-637

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010210766

Lobbying with two audiences : public vs private certification

Koessler, Frédéric - In: Mathematical social sciences 55 (2008) 3, pp. 305-314

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003720472

Common knowledge and consensus with noisy communication

Koessler, Frédéric - In: Mathematical social sciences 42 (2001) 2, pp. 139-159

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001592606

Persuasion games with higher-order uncertainty

Koessler, Frédéric - In: Journal of economic theory 110 (2003) 2, pp. 393-399

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001770508

Playing off-line games with bounded rationality

Renault, Jér^ome; Scarsini, Marco; Tomala, Tristan - In: Mathematical social sciences 56 (2008) 2, pp. 207-223

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003780800

Mechanism design and communication networks

Renou, Ludovic (contributor); Tomala, Tristan (contributor) - 2008

This paper characterizes the class of communication networks for which, in any environment (utilities and beliefs), every incentive-compatible social choice function is (partially) implementable. Among others, in environments with either common and independent beliefs and private values or a bad...