Similar Search Results

Incentive magnitude effects in experimental games : bigger is not necessarily better

Pulford, Briony D.; Colman, Andrew M.; Loomes, Graham - In: Games 9 (2018) 1/4, pp. 1-10

In experimental games, task-related incentives are payments to experimental subjects that vary according to their …-form games under task-related incentives of conventional magnitude and compared them with choices and reasons in the same games … under incentives five times as large. Both strategy choices and self-reported reasons for choices were almost …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011848336

Promoting cooperation : the distribution of reward and punishment power

Nosenzo, Daniele; Sefton, Martin - 2012

Recent work in experimental economics on the effectiveness of rewards and punishments for promoting cooperation mainly … evidence showing how concentrating reward/punishment power in one group member affects cooperation. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578208

Voting on the threat of exclusion in a public goods experiment

Dannenberg, Astrid; Haita-Falah, Corina; Zitzelsberger, … - 2019

Ostracism is practiced by virtually all societies around the world as a means of enforcing cooperation and excluding … contributors are excluded but also because high contributors sustain a higher cooperation level under the exclusion institution …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011992304

Discretionary sanctions and rewards in the repeated inspection game

Nosenzo, Daniele; Offerman, Theo; Sefton, Martin; Veen, … - 2012

We experimentally investigate a repeated "inspection game" where, in the stage game, an employee can either work or shirk and an employer simultaneously chooses to inspect or not inspect. Combined payoffs are maximized when the employee works and the employer does not inspect. However, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578200

Discretionary sanctions and rewards in the repeated inspection game

Nosenzo, Daniele; Offerman, Theo; Sefton, Martin; Veen, … - 2014 - This version: 02 April 2014

We experimentally investigate a repeated "inspection game" where, in the stage game, an employee can either work or shirk and an employer simultaneously chooses to inspect or not inspect. The unique equilibrium of the stage game is in mixed strategies with positive probabilities of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010340303

Social motives in intergroup conflict

Weisel, Ori; Zultan, Ro'i - 2013

We experimentally test the social motives behind individual participation in intergroup conflict by manipulating the framing and symmetry of conflict. We find that behavior in conflict depends on whether one is harmed by actions perpetrated by the out-group, but not on one’s own influence on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009792169

Leadership by Example and by Pre-Game Communication in Social Dilemma Situations

Pogrebna, Ganna; Krantz, David; Schade, Christian; … - 2009

This paper compares the effects of two leadership styles: leading by pre-game communication and leading by example using an iterated voluntary contribution game. We find that pre-game communication increases the level of individual contributions in the game and has essentially the same impact on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014215365

Harnessing Reciprocity to Promote Cooperation and the Provisioning of Public Goods

Rand, David G.; Yoeli, Erez; Hoffman, Moshe - 2015

large body of research demonstrates the power of “reciprocity” for inducing cooperation: When others know that you have … they think others are also cooperating; and people can develop habits of cooperation that shape their default inclinations …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014037089

Communication and trust in principal-team relationships : experimental evidence

Kleine, Marco; Kube, Sebastian - 2015

We study how upward communication - from workers to managers - about individual efforts affects the effectiveness of gift exchange as a contract-enforcement device for work teams. Our findings suggest that the use of such self-assessments can be detrimental to workers' performance. In the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010467800

Voting for burden sharing rules in public goods games

Gallier, Carlo; Kesternich, Martin; Sturm, Bodo - 2014

In this experiment, we endogenize the choice of which contribution scheme is implemented in a public goods game. We investigate three rule-based contribution schemes. In a first step, players agree on a common group provision level using the principle of the smallest common denominator....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010405384

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Next
Last