This paper shows that an incumbent monopolist's incentive confronting a new entrant depends on the degree of product differentiation and the strength of network externality. If products are homogeneous, the incumbent never wants to invite entry regardless of the degree of network externality. On...

The lack of complete information has been considered as a barrier to the optimal regulation. This paper shows that this is true for price regulation, but not for entry regulation. The performance of an entry regulation under asymmetric information can be better than that under complete...

This paper is about limit pricing under complete information and endogenous market demands. If pre-entry and post-entry market demands are correlated, then limit pricing can be an equilibrium strategy under complete information without government intervention. Furthermore, with government...

This paper analyzes the signaling nature of litigation selection under asymmetric information. For the robustness of the analysis, we separate the litigation selection process, where the signaling from the informed party plays the key role, from the actual settlement where a more general...

This paper analyzes the non-dichotomy nature of the entry and the price regulations under asymmetric information. When current market is a monopoly and there is a potential entrant, the government should make decisions both on the monopoly (price) regulation and on the entry regulation...

This paper studies the signaling role of the litigation/settlement selection under asymmetric information. As an attempt to improve existing asymmetric information theory, we separate litigation/settlement selection process and the actual settlement bargaining process, and adopt an infinitely...

Excess entry theorem, which shows that the free market can generate too many firms, is a theoretic base for entry regulation. When the current market is a monopoly, entry is considered as excessive if the social welfare under the post-entry Cournot-Nash equilibrium, net of entry coast, is lower...

I develop a two-period model of entry deterrence with endogenous market demands such that the consumer's expectation about the future market structure is fulfilled in equilibrium. I find that both expectations (duopoly and monopoly) are fulfilled in the incumbent's price-setting game, while...

Cooperation does not easily scale up—strategic uncertainty increases as groups get larger, preventing coordination on the cooperative equilibrium. In an indefinitely repeated social dilemma experiment conducted in small and large groups, we add partial cooperation choices to the usual rigid...