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I study a mechanism design problem of allocating a single good to an agent when the mechanism is followed by a post-mechanism game (aftermarket) played between the agent and a third-party. The aftermarket is beyond the direct control of the designer. However, she can influence the information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011865063
We consider a multi-dimensional procurement problem in which sellers have private information about their costs and about a possible design flaw. The information about the design flaw is necessarily correlated. We solve for the optimal Bayesian procurement mechanism that implements the efficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011976063
Short-term electricity markets are key to an efficient production by generation units. We develop a two-period model to assess different bidding formats to determine for each bidding format the optimal bidding strategy of competitive generators facing price-uncertainty. We compare the results...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011916928
well as other recently opened lending websites allow people to auction microcredit over the internet and are in line with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011765009
I study a principal's optimal choice of constraint for an agent participating in an auction (or auction-like allocation … that the optimal auction with budget-constrained bidders has a standard solution analogous to the one for classic models. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673069
better off under the dynamic mechanism relative to a Vickrey-like auction because the intermediaries are more able to exploit …-like auction. Finally, I show that in large markets the dynamic mechanism and Vickrey-like auction have the same expected total …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014418049
pay, under symmetric independent private values. The first-price auction is the unique credible static mechanism. The … ascending auction is the unique credible strategy-proof mechanism …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012901115
I study auctions in which firms bid for licenses that reduce their marginal costs in a post-auction downstream market …. When there are three or more firms, I show that the Vickrey--Clarke--Groves (VCG) auction maximizes consumer surplus in … surplus is ambiguous. When the VCG auction does not maximize consumer surplus, I show that consumer surplus can be maximized …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012844073
We investigate the impact of using a clear scoring rule in a sealed bid multi-dimensional (A+B) procurement auction, as …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012846401
services per year, we leverage our characterization of the optimal mechanism to study the design of first-price-auction …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012244488