We consider a monopolist who sells indetical objects of common but unknown value in a herding-prone environment. Buyers make their purchasing decisions sequentially, and rely on a private signal as well as previous buyers´actions to infer the common value of the object. The model applies to a...

We study the mechanism design problem when the principal can condition the agent's transfers on the realization of ex post signals that are correlated with the agents' types. Cremer and McLean (Econometrica, 53(1985) 345-361; 56(1988) 1247-1258), McAfee and Reny (Econometrica, 6(1992) 395-421),...

This paper demonstrates that a seller prefers to exclude final consumers from an auction and sell only to resellers when these resellers can gain access, at a cost, to a sufficiently bigger market than the seller himself. The intuition is that resellers recoup their expenses for marketing the...

This paper considers mechanism design problems in environments with ambiguity‐sensitive individuals. The novel idea is to introduce ambiguity in mechanisms so as to exploit the ambiguity sensitivity of individuals. Deliberate engineering of ambiguity, through ambiguous mediated communication,...