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Estimation of Exchangeable Distribution with Order Statistics : Application to First-Price Auctions

Nakanishi, Hayato - 2020

-bid auction with affiliation. The results potentially extend the existing non-parametric identification result for first …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012848120

Assessment of Collusion Damages in First Price Auctions

Gabrielli, M. Florencia - 2020

asymmetric first-price auctions. It is based on the structural analysis of auction data and is consistent with antitrust damage …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012849214

Sample Spacings for Identification : The Case of English Auctions With Absentee Bidding

Marra, Marleen - 2020

benefit up to 13% from adopting a common reserve price rule equal to 120% of the Wine Department's pre-auction value estimate …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014096161

Secret reserve prices by uninformed sellers

Andreyanov, Pasha; Caoui, El Hadi - In: Quantitative economics : QE ; journal of the … 13 (2022) 3, pp. 1203-1256

If bidders are better informed than the seller about a common component of auction heterogeneity, the seller can …‐price auction under unobserved auction heterogeneity-imperfectly observed by the seller-that captures this rationale and derive … perfect information about unobserved auction heterogeneity would increase surplus by 5.22%. Combining a secret reserve price …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013382069

Screening Adaptive Cartels

Ortner, Juan M.; Chassang, Sylvain; Kawai, Kei; … - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2022

We propose an equilibrium theory of data-driven antitrust oversight in which regulators launch investigations on the basis of suspicious bidding patterns and cartels can adapt to the statistical screens used by regulators. We emphasize the use of asymptotically safe tests, i.e. tests that are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013334437