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Exclusion in the all-pay auction: An experimental investigation

Fehr, Dietmar; Schmid, Julia - 2011

Contest or auction designers who want to maximize the overall revenue are frequently concerned with a trade-off between …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281542

"One man's meat is another man's poison": An experimental study of voluntarily providing public projects that raise mixed feelings

Güth, Werner; Koukoumelis, Anastasios; Levati, M. Vittoria - 2011

We compare, on the basis of a procedurally fair provision point mechanism, bids for a public project from which some gain and some lose with bids for a less efficient public project from which all gain. In the main treatment, participants independently decide which one, if any, of the public...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281622

The winner's curse under behavioral institutions

Chlaß, Nadine - 2011

competitive common value auction, parties sidestep both market inefficiency and a winner's curse by judging quality-by-price, and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281633

On individual cursedness: How personality shapes individuals' sensitivity to incur a winner's curse

Chlaß, Nadine - 2011

-value auction where the explanations above do not apply, tracks down the potential source of the curse, and tests to what extent …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281650

Does procedural fairness crowd out other-regarding concerns? A bidding experiment

Güth, Werner; Levati, M. Vittoria; Ploner, Matteo - 2010

Bidding rules that guarantee procedural fairness may induce more equilibrium bidding and moderate other-regarding concerns. In our experiment, we assume commonly known true values and only two bidders to implement a best-case scenario for other-regarding concerns. The two-by-two factorial design...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281671

Costless discrimination and unequal achievements in a labour market experiment

Filippin, Antonio; Guala, Francesco - 2011

We investigate the emergence of discrimination in an experiment where individuals affiliated to different groups compete for a monetary prize, submitting independent bids to an auctioneer. The auctioneer receives perfect information about the bids (i.e. there is no statistical discrimination),...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282262

Selection bias, demographic effects, and ability effects in common value auction experiments

Casari, Marco; Ham, John C.; Kagel, John H. - 2005

We find clear demographic and ability effects on bidding in common value auctions: inexperienced women are much more susceptible to the winner's curse than men, controlling for SAT/ACT scores and college major; economics and business majors substantially overbid relative to other majors; and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010283476

Adjusting prices in the many-to-many assignment game

Sotomayor, Marilda - 2008

to keep the transfers to the sellers as low as possible. In each step of the auction, to which sellers should those …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284074

Uncovered bargaining solutions

Lombardi, Michele; Mariotti, Marco - 2007

An uncovered bargaining solution is a bargaining solution for which there exists a complete and strict relation (tournament) such that, for each feasible set, the bargaining solution set coincides with the uncovered set of the tournament. We provide a characterization of a class of uncovered...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284134

A laboratory stress-test of bid, double and offer auctions

Søberg, Morten - 2002

This paper reports on the empirical properties of the bid auction (buyers propose prices), offer auction (sellers … suggest prices) and double auction (both buyers and seller initiate price quotes). These trading institutions are stress … curve shift unpredictably between trading periods. The principal result is threefold. First, double auction prices tend to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284474