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Relational contracts, the cost of enforcing formal contracts, and capital structure choice : theory and evidence

Fahn, Matthias; Merlo, Valeria; Wamser, Georg - 2017

This paper shows that the cost of enforcing contracts governing non-financial relationships between firms affects a firm's financing structure. We analyze the interaction between a firm's capital structure and the type of contracts it uses to deal with its suppliers. We first develop a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674383

Dynamic relational contracts under complete information

Thomas, Jonathan P.; Worrall, Timothy - In: Journal of economic theory 175 (2018), pp. 624-651

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011980738

Incomplete contracts in dynamic procurement

Gretschko, Vitali; Pollrich, Martin - 2019

We analyze the problem of a buyer who purchases a long-term project from one of several suppliers. A changing state of the world influences the costs of the suppliers. Complete contracts conditioning on all future realizations of the state are infeasible. We show that contractual incompleteness...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012105726

Delegation with incomplete and renegotiable contracts

Gerratana, Emanuele; Koçkesen, Levent - 2008 - This version: April 2008

It is well known that delegating the play of a game to an agent via incentive contracts may serve as a commitment device and hence provide a strategic advantage. Previous literature has shown that any Nash equilibrium outcome of an extensive-form principals-only game can be supported as a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012001777

Syndicate size and the choice of covenants in debt contracts

Saavedra, Daniel - In: The accounting review : a publication of the American … 93 (2018) 6, pp. 301-329

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011966815

Contract theory in the spotlight : Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström, 2016 Nobel Prize winners

Fleckinger, Pierre; Martimort, David - In: Revue d'économie politique 128 (2018) 4, pp. 493-533

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011943020

Renegotiation of dynamically incomplete contracts

Zhu, John Y. - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011843963

Contracts, incentives and organizations : Hart and Holmström Nobel Laureates

Smirnov, Vladimir; Wait, Andrew - In: Review of political economy 29 (2017) 4, pp. 493-522

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011882413

More than the money : payoff-irrelevant terms in relational contracts

Cromwell, Erich; Goerg, Sebastian J.; Ziółkowska, Monika - 2018

two economically equivalent contracts - a fixed-term renewable and an open-ended at-will contract. Each contract provides … partners with full flexibility regarding the length and termination of their interaction. When only one contract type is … contract type. However, when both contracts are available offering a fixed-term instead of an open-ended contract is perceived …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011893426

Contract, renegotiation, and holdup : an optimal contract when interim renegotiation is possible

Göller, Daniel - In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics : JITE 175 (2019) 4, pp. 736-764

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012168524