In this paper we study the optimal file-sharing mechanism in a peer-to-peer network with a mechanism design perspective. This mechanism improves upon existing incentive schemes. In particular, we show that peer-approved scheme is never optimal and service-quality scheme is optimal only under...

We study customization in the Hotelling model with two firms. In addition to providing ideal varieties, the perceived uniqueness of a customized product contributes independently to consumer utility. We show that only when consumer preferences for uniqueness are high customization occurs in...

We consider a duopoly market with heterogenous consumers. The firms initially produce vertically differentiated standard products located at the end points of the variety interval. Customization provides ideal varieties for consumers but has no effect on quality. The firms first choose whether...

We analyze a duopoly game in which products are initially differentiated in variety and quality. Each consumer has a most preferred variety and a quality valuation. Customization provides ideal varieties but has no effect on product qualities. The firms first choose whether to customize their...

Anderson and Renault (1999) show that when search cost is needed to evaluate any product, a U-shaped relationship exists between equilibrium price and product differentiation. This paper revisits this relationship by incorporating partial-depth search in a sequential search process which allows...

This paper studies the incentive for a monopoly to license its technology. It shows that a patent-holding monopoly may be willing to license its proprietary technology to a potential competitor when such a technology transfer has a market-expanding effect

It is well established in vertical product differentiation models that the high-quality firm reaps a larger profit in a two-stage quality-price game as long as the cost of quality improvement is zero or is borne as fixed cost in the first stage quality choice. This note shows that the...

Using the classical sequential search framework by Anderson and Renault (1999), this paper lets consumers search partially and shows that (1) consumers optimally search products at a partial depth when search cost is large, and (2) due to partial depth, firms’ prices and consumer surplus are...

Using the classical sequential search framework by Anderson and Renault (1999), this paper lets consumers search partially and shows that (1) consumers optimally search products at a partial depth when search cost is large, and (2) due to partial depth, firms’ prices and consumer surplus are...

This paper finds that in a linear Stackelberg duopoly model, the follower is more likely to license a cost-reducing innovation to the leader than the leader is to the follower, regardless of whether licensing is in the form of a fixed fee or royalty per unit of output. Under fixed-fee licensing,...