We develop a model in which multinational investors decide about the modes of organization, the locations of production, and the markets to be served. Foreign investments are driven by market-seeking and cost-reducing motives. We further assume that investors face costs of control that vary...

A hierarchically structured rent-seeking contest may be associated with lower equilibrium expenditure than a corresponding flat contest. In this chapter we discuss how this fact may be used to explain the structure of organizations such as firms, including why firms commonly have outside owners.

We develop a model in which multinational investors decide about the modes of organization, the locations of production, and the markets to be served. Foreign investments are driven by market-seeking and cost-reducing motives. We further assume that investors face costs of control that vary...

We analyze the interplay between product market prices and firm boundary decisions. Enterprises are heterogeneous with respect to their productivities and each enterprise chooses between two ownership structures--centralized ownership (integration) performs well in coordinating managerial...

The paper studies agents' investment decisions between general and specific investments under different ownership structures in a thin, decentralized market where each agent's decision affects the decisions and welfare of other (otherwise unrelated) agents mainly through indirect market...