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Stability of climate coalitions in a cartel formation game
Finus, Michael; Ierland, Ekko C. van; Dellink, Rob - 2003
concept of internal and external stability to a cartel formation game. It is shown that only if benefits from global abatement … theory. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011591872
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Coalition Formation in a Global Warming Game : How the Design of Protocols Affects the Success of Environmental Treaty-Making
Eyckmans, Johan; Finus, Michael - 2013
We combine the newest concepts o non-cooperative coalition theory with a computable general equilibrium model close to … theory that in the case of greenhouse gases stable coalition structures (partial cooperation) can close the gap between the … the seminal RICE-model of Nordhaus and Yang (1996) to determine stable coalition structures in a global warming game. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014051299
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Modesty pays : sometimes!
Finus, Michael - 2004
from the standard assumption of joint welfare maximization of coalition members, implying ambitious abatement targets and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011602768
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How the rules of coalition formation affect stability of international environmental agreements
Finus, Michael; Rundshagen, Bianca - 2003
This paper compares stability of international environmental agreements for six different rules of coalition formation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011591895
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How the Rules of Coalition Formation Affect Stability of International Environmental Agreements
Finus, Michael; Rundshagen, Bianca - 2003
This paper compares stability of international environmental agreements for six different rules of coalition formation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014075305
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Modesty Pays : Sometimes!
Finus, Michael - 2004
from the standard assumption of joint welfare maximization of coalition members, implying ambitious abatement targets and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014071763
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Das Kyoto-Protokoll : eine ökonomische Analyse unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der flexiblen Mechanismen
Haensgen, Tineke - 2002
In diesem Papier wird untersucht, ob bzw. wie sich im Rahmen des Kyoto Protokolls die globalen Emissionsreduktionsziele mit der ökonomischen Rationalität der beteiligten Länder in Einklang bringen lassen. Den äußeren Rahmen der Analyse bildet eine spieltheoretische Darstellung der...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010499900
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Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel Formation Game
Finus, Michael; van Ierland, Ekko; Dellink, Rob - 2003
concept of internal and external stability to a cartel formation game. It is shown that only if benefits from global abatement … theory. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325097
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Permit Trading and Stability of International Climate Agreements
Altamirano-Cabrera, Juan-Carlos; Finus, Michael - 2006
We analyze the implication of different allocation schemes of CO2-emission permits for stability and the success of international climate agreements. Our model combines a game theoretical with an empirical module that comprises 12 world regions and captures important dynamic aspects of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014057589
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Stability of climate coalitions in a cartel formation game
Finus, Michael; Ierland, Ekko C. van; Dellink, Rob - 2003
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001801077