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Dynamic Legislative Bargaining with Endogenous Agenda Setting Authority

Cotton, Christopher - 2013

Models of repeated legislative bargaining typically assume that an agenda setter is randomly selected each period, even if the agenda setter in the previous period successfully passed a proposal. In reality, successful legislative agenda setters (e.g., speakers, committee chairs) tend to hold...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014189684

Tax Elections & Private Bargaining

Field, Heather M. - 2012

Focal points for private bargaining occur every instance the tax law provides a tax election that directly affects … costs, this article analyzes how impediments to negotiation should affect the design of two key election parameters: (1) the … allocation, among the affected taxpayers, of the power to make the election, and (2) the default rule that will apply if no …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014180760

The inter-institutional distribution of power in EU codecision

Napel, Stefan; Widgrén, Mika - 2004

This paper analyzes the a priori influence of the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of Ministers (CM) on legislation of the European Union adopted under its codecision procedure. In contrast to studies which use conventional power indices, both institutions are assumed to act...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284909

The inter-institutional distribution of power in EU codecision

Napel, Stefan; Widgrén, Mika - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261094

Potential Maximization and Coalition Government Formation

Garratt, Rod; Qin, Cheng-Zhong; Parco, James E.; … - 2004

A model of coalition government formation is presented in which inefficient, non-minimal winning coalitions may form in Nash equilibrium. Predictions for five games are presented and tested experimentally. The experimental data support potential maximization as a refinement of Nash equilibrium....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011324956

Political, institutional and economic determinants of coalition cabinets survival

Carmignani, Fabrizio - In: Istituzioni politiche e finanza pubblica, (pp. 121-146). 2000

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001805676

Cooperation and Competition in the European Parliament : A Game Theoretical Interpretation

Volacu, Alexandru - 2012

In this paper the author analyzes the nature of the legislative process which takes place within the European Parliament by studying the bilateral interactions among its relevant decisional groups, i.e. the parliamentary groups. In this sense, the author uses a methodological approach inspired...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014172110

Seuential vote buying

Chen, Ying; Zápal, Jan - 2021

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012583377

The Condorcet paradox revisited

Herings P.J.J.; H, Houba - Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE), … - 2013

We analyze the Condorcet paradox within a strategic bargaining model with majority voting, exogenous recognition probabilities, and no discounting. Stationary subgame perfect equilibria (SSPE) exist whenever the geometric mean of the players' risk coefficients, ratios of utility differences...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010856552

The Condorcet Paradox Revisited

Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Houba, Harold - 2010

We analyze the simplest Condorcet cycle with three players and three alternatives within a strategic bargaining model with recognition probabilities and costless delay. Mixed consistent subgame perfect equilibria exist whenever the geometric mean of the agents' risk coefficients, ratios of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325975